The Existence of Equilibria in the 3-Facility Hotelling Model in a Tree

DOI10.1287/TRSC.27.1.39MaRDI QIDQ5285889zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H. A. Eiselt, G. Laporte

Publication date 29 June 1993

Published in Transportation Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.27.1.39

zbMATH Keywords

locationequilibrialocation on tree network

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Trees (05C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

Recommendations

• Locational equilibrium of two facilities on a tree
• Hotelling's duopoly on a tree
• Technical note: The competitive facility location problem in a duopoly: advances beyond trees
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
• Location-price equilibrium on trees for a duopoly with negative externality

Cited in

(14)

• Open problems in cooperative location games
• Location Science in Canada
• Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
• Technical note: The competitive facility location problem in a duopoly: advances beyond trees
• A leader-follower model for discrete competitive facility location
• Maximal covering location problem with price decision for revenue maximization in a competitive environment
• Equilibria in Competitive Location Models
• Competitive location models: a review
• Hotelling's duopoly on a tree
• Locational equilibrium of two facilities on a tree
• Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games
• Nash equilibria in location games on a network
• Robust equilibria in location games
• Condorcet winners on median spaces

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