The Existence of Equilibria in the 3-Facility Hotelling Model in a Tree
DOI10.1287/TRSC.27.1.39zbMATH Open0779.90054OpenAlexW2074659255MaRDI QIDQ5285889FDOQ5285889
Authors: H. A. Eiselt, G. Laporte 
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Transportation Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.27.1.39
Recommendations
Applications of graph theory (05C90) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Trees (05C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cited In (14)
- Nash equilibria in location games on a network
- Technical Note—The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Advances Beyond Trees
- Competitive location models: a review
- Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
- Robust equilibria in location games
- Open problems in cooperative location games
- Maximal covering location problem with price decision for revenue maximization in a competitive environment
- Locational equilibrium of two facilities on a tree
- A leader-follower model for discrete competitive facility location
- Hotelling's duopoly on a tree
- Condorcet winners on median spaces
- Equilibria in Competitive Location Models
- Location Science in Canada
- Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games
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