Buyback contracts to solve upstream opportunism
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Publication:2023973
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.05.021zbMATH Open1487.90248OpenAlexW3027315764MaRDI QIDQ2023973FDOQ2023973
Authors: Toker Doganoglu, Firat Inceoglu 
Publication date: 3 May 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.05.021
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Cites Work
- On the Lambert \(w\) function
- Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects
- Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty
- Note. The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods
- Buyback contracts with price-dependent demands: effects of demand uncertainty
- Direct marketing, indirect profits: A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design
- Analysis of the impact of price-sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating supply chain
- A composite contract based on buy back and quantity flexibility contracts
Cited In (1)
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