Incentives for production capacity improvement in construction supplier development

DOI10.3934/jimo.2019118zbMath1474.91079MaRDI QIDQ2031339

Yanjun He, Wei Zeng, Delie Ming, Hongtao Zhou, Ming-Hui Yu

Publication date: 9 June 2021

Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2019118

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent; Stackelberg game; incentive; production capacity; construction industry; supplier development

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91B43: Principal-agent models

Cites Work

• Wholesale-price contracts with postponed and fixed retail prices
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• Do Firms Invest in Forecasting Efficiently? The Effect of Competition on Demand Forecast Investments and Supply Chain Coordination
• Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
• The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
• A Generalized Quantity Discount Pricing Model to Increase Supplier's Profits