Game analysis of the multiagent evolution of existing building green retrofitting from the perspective of green credit

DOI10.1155/2021/5560671MaRDI QIDQ2045317zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mengjia Zhang, Shiwen Zhao, Li-Wen Chen

Publication date 12 August 2021

Published in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5560671

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Review text

Summary: Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners' strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

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Cites work

• Chaos and Hopf bifurcation of a finance system
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Cited in

(2)

• Evolutionary game analysis on government subsidy policy and bank loan strategy in China's distributed photovoltaic market
• Evolutionary game of government subsidy strategy for prefabricated buildings based on prospect theory

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