Evolutionary game of government subsidy strategy for prefabricated buildings based on prospect theory

DOI10.1155/2020/8863563MaRDI QIDQ2217047zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yu Liu, Dong Cai, Chun-xiang Guo, Haizhen Huang

Publication date 18 December 2020

Published in Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/8863563

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Decision theory for games (91A35) Applications of game theory (91A80) Utility theory (91B16)

Review text

Summary: Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

Recommendations

• Government supervision mode selection in the promotion period of prefabricated construction using evolutionary game
• Study on cooperative mechanism of prefabricated producers based on evolutionary game theory
• Game analysis of the multiagent evolution of existing building green retrofitting from the perspective of green credit
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Cites work

• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk

Cited in

(6)

• Study on cooperative mechanism of prefabricated producers based on evolutionary game theory
• Game analysis of the multiagent evolution of existing building green retrofitting from the perspective of green credit
• Evolutionary game analysis on government subsidy policy and bank loan strategy in China's distributed photovoltaic market
• Government low-carbon policies optimization for smart transportation enterprises
• Study on evolutionary game of poverty reduction and development behavior of government and enterprise based on perspective theory
• Government supervision mode selection in the promotion period of prefabricated construction using evolutionary game

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