Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
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Publication:2078097
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.015zbMATH Open1485.91122OpenAlexW4210316161MaRDI QIDQ2078097FDOQ2078097
Authors: Swagata Bhattacharjee 
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper15.pdf
Recommendations
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences
- Recursive multiple-priors.
- Dynamic variational preferences
- Dynamic choice under ambiguity
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- Learning Under Ambiguity
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
Cited In (9)
- Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty
- Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
- Adaptive contracting: the trial-and-error approach to outsourcing
- R\&D outsourcing in an innovation-driven supply chain
- Outsourcing of innovation
- Effects of informal contracts on innovative cooperation among enterprises in industrial clusters: an evolutionary game analysis
- The Management of Innovation
- A comparison of milestone contract and royalty contract under critical value criterion in R\&D alliance
- Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing
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