A two-echelon supply chain contract under advertisement and retail price-dependent demand

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Publication:2113816





Summary: In this study, we have considered the coordination issues of a supply chain system composed of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier offers a single product to the retailer, and the customer demand for the product at the retailer's end is advertisement and retail price dependent. We have investigated the behaviour of the two-layered supply chain under the integrated and non-integrated scenario. Both models' nature provides significant perceptions to an organisation's manager to achieve optimum strategy under price and advertisement dependent demand. The main objective is to maximise the supply chain's overall profit by optimising selling price, wholesale price, order quantity, and replenishment time. We have established the decentralised structure under the Stackelberg game approach to find the optimal values of each channel member. A numerical example and study of sensitivity analysis are provided to validate our proposed model.











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