Another look at extraction and randomization of Groth's zk-SNARK
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Publication:2145409
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64322-8_22zbMATH Open1491.94036OpenAlexW3209656134MaRDI QIDQ2145409FDOQ2145409
Authors: Karim Baghery, Markulf Kohlweiss, Janno Siim, Mikhail Volkhov
Publication date: 17 June 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64322-8_22
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Cites Work
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- Breaking RSA may not be equivalent to factoring
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- On the efficiency of privacy-preserving smart contract systems
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Cited In (14)
- A unified framework for non-universal SNARKs
- Simulation Extractable Versions of Groth’s zk-SNARK Revisited
- From polynomial IOP and commitments to non-malleable zkSNARKs
- How to compile polynomial IOP into simulation-extractable SNARKs: a modular approach
- Snarky ceremonies
- Composition with knowledge assumptions
- On the efficiency of privacy-preserving smart contract systems
- Spartan and bulletproofs are simulation-extractable (for free!)
- Witness-succinct universally-composable SNARKs
- What makes Fiat-Shamir zkSNARKs (updatable SRS) simulation extractable?
- Impossibilities in succinct arguments: black-box extraction and more
- Vector commitments with proofs of smallness: short range proofs and more
- Fiat-Shamir bulletproofs are non-malleable (in the algebraic group model)
- Fully homomorphic encryption beyond IND-CCA1 security: integrity through verifiability
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