Fiat-Shamir bulletproofs are non-malleable (in the algebraic group model)
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Publication:2170055
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Cites work
- Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
- Another look at extraction and randomization of Groth's zk-SNARK
- Communication-Efficient Non-interactive Proofs of Knowledge with Online Extractors
- Cryptography in the Multi-string Model
- Fiat-Shamir: from practice to theory
- How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842511 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1406779 (Why is no real title available?)
- Interactive oracle proofs
- Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the quantum random oracle model
- On the Non-malleability of the Fiat-Shamir Transform
- On the size of pairing-based non-interactive arguments
- Post-quantum security of Fiat-Shamir
- Simulation-Sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures
- Snarky signatures: minimal signatures of knowledge from simulation-extractable snarks
- The algebraic group model and its applications
- The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
- The measure-and-reprogram technique 2.0: multi-round Fiat-Shamir and more
- Tight state-restoration soundness in the algebraic group model
Cited in
(24)- Tight state-restoration soundness in the algebraic group model
- Witness-succinct universally-composable SNARKs
- Spartan and bulletproofs are simulation-extractable (for free!)
- Privacy-preserving blueprints
- Efficient and universally composable single secret leader election from pairings
- Zero-knowledge protocols for the subset sum problem from MPC-in-the-head with rejection
- What makes Fiat-Shamir zkSNARKs (updatable SRS) simulation extractable?
- Zero-knowledge for homomorphic key-value commitments with applications to privacy-preserving ledgers
- Efficient zero-knowledge arguments and digital signatures \textit{via} sharing conversion \textit{in the head}
- Practical round-optimal blind signatures in the ROM from standard assumptions
- Eagle: efficient privacy preserving smart contracts
- From polynomial IOP and commitments to non-malleable zkSNARKs
- How to compile polynomial IOP into simulation-extractable SNARKs: a modular approach
- Vector commitments with proofs of smallness: short range proofs and more
- Simulation-extractable KZG polynomial commitments and applications to HyperPlonk
- Lookup arguments: improvements, extensions and applications to zero-knowledge decision trees
- A holistic security analysis of Monero transactions
- Fiat-Shamir bulletproofs are non-malleable (in the Random Oracle Model)
- Straight-line knowledge extraction for multi-round protocols
- SNARKs for virtual machines are non-malleable
- Universally composable non-interactive zero-knowledge from sigma protocols via a new straight-line compiler
- HARTS: high-threshold, adaptively secure, and robust threshold Schnorr signatures
- Plonk is simulation extractable in ROM under falsifiable assumptions
- On the simulation-extractability of proof-carrying data
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