Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamics with time delay
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Publication:2186554
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.06.012zbMATH Open1447.91021arXivq-bio/0409024OpenAlexW2125904738WikidataQ51989068 ScholiaQ51989068MaRDI QIDQ2186554FDOQ2186554
Publication date: 9 June 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new players are born from parents who played in the past. We consider two-player games with two strategies and a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy. We show that in the first type of dynamics, it is asymptotically stable for small time delays and becomes unstable for big ones when the population oscillates around its stationary state. In the second type of dynamics, however, evolutionarily stable strategy is asymptotically stable for any size of a time delay.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409024
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Stability theory of functional-differential equations (34K20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Optimal stochastic control (93E20)
Cites Work
Cited In (27)
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