On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the `chaos theorems' in a laboratory experiment

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09741-4zbMATH Open1437.91195OpenAlexW2999901623MaRDI QIDQ2188233FDOQ2188233

Authors: Jan Sauermann 

Publication date: 10 June 2020

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09741-4

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zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentmajority rulesocial choicecommittee decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models

Cited In (3)

• Preferences over procedures and outcomes in judgment aggregation: an experimental study
• The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto
• Information manipulation and majority rule

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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