On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the `chaos theorems' in a laboratory experiment

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09741-4MaRDI QIDQ2188233zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jan Sauermann

Publication date 10 June 2020

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09741-4

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentmajority rulesocial choicecommittee decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Recommendations

• The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
• Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
• The instability of instability of centered distributions
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Cites work

• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule

Cited in

(3)

• Preferences over procedures and outcomes in judgment aggregation: an experimental study
• The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto
• Information manipulation and majority rule

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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