Incentives and coordination in bottleneck models
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Publication:2190379
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_3zbMath1443.91006arXiv1808.00034OpenAlexW2886838979MaRDI QIDQ2190379
Publication date: 18 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00034
2-person games (91A05) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)
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