Incentives and coordination in bottleneck models

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_3zbMath1443.91006arXiv1808.00034OpenAlexW2886838979MaRDI QIDQ2190379

Sigal Oren, Moshe Babaioff

Publication date: 18 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00034

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchyVickrey's bottleneck model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)

Related Items (1)

Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties

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