Theoretical Computer Science
DOI10.1007/B13810zbMATH Open1257.68081OpenAlexW3144329707MaRDI QIDQ5897347FDOQ5897347
Authors: Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien, P. G. Spirakis 
Publication date: 23 February 2010
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/b13810
Recommendations
- Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1128830
- Universality of Nash Equilibria
- STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES
- Nash refinements of equilibria
- On Nash equilibrium
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1932364
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Approximation algorithms (68W25) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
Cited In (22)
- Which is the worst-case Nash equilibrium?
- Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture
- Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2003
- The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
- Utilitarian resource assignment
- How to find Nash equilibria with extreme total latency in network congestion games?
- The equilibrium existence of a robust routing game under interval uncertainty
- On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria
- A penalized best-response algorithm for nonlinear single-path routing problems
- Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
- Structural Information and Communication Complexity
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- $\mathcal{NP}$ -Hardness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Scheduling and Connection Games
- Nash equilibria in all-optical networks
- The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
- Incentives and coordination in bottleneck models
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture
- Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria
- Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
- Cost sharing mechanisms for fair pricing of resource usage
- SOFSEM 2006: Theory and Practice of Computer Science
This page was built for publication: Theoretical Computer Science
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5897347)
