Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
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Publication:2195241
DOI10.1007/S00712-019-00679-3zbMath1448.91142OpenAlexW2187081209MaRDI QIDQ2195241
Publication date: 8 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00679-3
information sharingcost-reducing R\&D investmentobservable R\&D investmentprivate information regarding R\&D outcomesuncertain R\&D outcomeunobservable R\&D
Cites Work
- Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R\&D strategy choice
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Disincentives for cost-reducing investment
- International asymmetric R\&D rivalry and industrial strategy
- Competition, innovation, and the effect of R\&D knowledge
- Competing R\&D joint ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers
- Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R\&D
- Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly
- Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation
- Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- R&D in a duopoly under incomplete information
- Market Size, Trade, and Productivity
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