Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
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Publication:2195241
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Cites work
- Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R\&D
- Competing R\&D joint ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers
- Competition, imitation and growth with step-by-step innovation
- Competition, innovation, and the effect of R\&D knowledge
- Disincentives for cost-reducing investment
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R\&D strategy choice
- International asymmetric R\&D rivalry and industrial strategy
- Market Size, Trade, and Productivity
- R\&D in a duopoly under incomplete information
- Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly
Cited in
(5)- Research and development with publicly observable outcomes
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- R\&D in a duopoly under incomplete information
- Irreversible investment and R\&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly
- Duopoly firms' decisions on disclosing their R\&D investment information
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