R\&D in a duopoly under incomplete information

DOI10.1111/IJET.12174MaRDI QIDQ5215960zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rittwik Chatterjee, S. Chattopadhyay, Tarun Kabiraj

Publication date 14 February 2020

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12174

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationduopolytype distributionR\&D incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
• Firms' R\&D decisions under incomplete information
• Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
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• R\&D information sharing in a mixed duopoly and incentive subsidy for research joint venture competition

Cited in

(7)

• Firms' R\&D decisions under incomplete information
• Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
• A dynamic duopoly Cournot model with R\&D efforts and its dynamic behavior analysis
• Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
• R&D subsidies in a duopoly market with outsourcing to the rival firm
• Managerial compensation and research and development investment in a two-period agency setting
• A note on the analysis of the expected value of perfect information with respect to a class of R\&D projects

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