R\&D in a duopoly under incomplete information
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Publication:5215960
DOI10.1111/IJET.12174zbMATH Open1432.91075OpenAlexW2885539858MaRDI QIDQ5215960FDOQ5215960
Authors: Rittwik Chatterjee, S. Chattopadhyay, Tarun Kabiraj 
Publication date: 14 February 2020
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12174
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Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cited In (7)
- Firms' R\&D decisions under incomplete information
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- A dynamic duopoly Cournot model with R\&D efforts and its dynamic behavior analysis
- Observable versus unobservable R\&D investments in duopolies
- R&D subsidies in a duopoly market with outsourcing to the rival firm
- Managerial compensation and research and development investment in a two-period agency setting
- A note on the analysis of the expected value of perfect information with respect to a class of R\&D projects
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