The cross-entropy method for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1155/2020/5691719MaRDI QIDQ2209236zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hanmi Lin, Changping Liu, Jie Xie, Baixiu Ni, Yongqiang Chen

Publication date 28 October 2020

Published in Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/5691719

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

Summary: The combinatorial auction is one of the important methods used for multi-item auctions, and the solution to the winner determination problem (WDP) is the key factor in the widespread application of combinatorial auctions. This paper explores the use of the cross-entropy method to solve the WDP, which is an NP problem. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated on the basis of two well-known benchmark test cases. The experimental results show that, compared with the genetic algorithm and the particle swarm optimization algorithm, the cross-entropy (CE) method has the advantages of a higher success rate and a shorter time for solving the WDP. Therefore, the CE method provides a high-quality solution for the effective solution of the problem of determining winning bids in combined auctions.

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Cited in

(6)

• A hybrid ant colony algorithm for the winner determination problem
• An effective discrete dynamic convexized method for solving the winner determination problem
• A Lagrangian approach to the winner determination problem in iterative combinatorial reverse auctions
• Study on the winning probability in procurement combinational auction with tree structure
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6311405 (Why is no real title available?)
• Recent Advances in Constraints

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