On the supersingular GPST attack

DOI10.1515/JMC-2021-0020MaRDI QIDQ2239798zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrea Basso, Fabien Pazuki

Publication date 5 November 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00409

zbMATH Keywords

isogeniesmodular invariantssupersingular elliptic curves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algebraic coding theory; cryptography (number-theoretic aspects) (11T71) Elliptic curves (14H52) Isogeny (14K02) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94) Cryptography (94A60)

Abstract: We explain why the first Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman and the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation fails in some cases.

Review text

Galbraith Petit-Shani-Ti (GPST) attack is an active attack against the supersingular isogeny-based cryptosystem, also known as,the supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH). The attack allows an attacker who interacts with a static key over multiple rounds of SIDH key exchange and in this correspondence, the attacker can find one bit of information about the other participant's private key and hence can find the full secret key by repeating the process. The GPST attack is known for its important role in security. In this article, the authors investigate some specific conditions that show the attack fails to recover the secret key. In order to illustrate this, they present an example where the GPST attack fails to recover the private key of a SIDH key exchange.

Recommendations

• Improved torsion-point attacks on SIDH variants
• A new adaptive attack on SIDH
• Fault attack on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems
• Side-channel attacks on quantum-resistant supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman
• On the cost of computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves

Cites work

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Cited in

(7)

• Fault attack on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems
• Solving the DLP with low Hamming weight product exponents and improved attacks on the GPS identification scheme
• (Short paper) Analysis of a strong fault attack on static/ephemeral CSIDH
• A new adaptive attack on SIDH
• Dispelling myths on superposition attacks: formal security model and attack analyses
• Cryptanalysis of an oblivious PRF from supersingular isogenies
• Attack on SHealS and HealS: the second wave of GPST

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