Quantum information versus epistemic logic: an analysis of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem

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Publication:2286504

DOI10.1007/S10701-019-00298-4zbMATH Open1481.03006arXiv1909.11889OpenAlexW3100151021WikidataQ127189628 ScholiaQ127189628MaRDI QIDQ2286504FDOQ2286504


Authors: Florian J. Boge Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 22 January 2020

Published in: Foundations of Physics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: A recent no-go theorem (Frauchiger and Renner, 2018) establishes a contradiction from a specific application of quantum theory to a multi-agent setting. The proof of this theorem relies heavily on notions such as 'knows' or `is certain that'. This has stimulated an analysis of the theorem by Nurgalieva and del Rio (2018), in which they claim that it shows the "[i]nadequacy of modal logic in quantum settings" (ibid.). In this paper, we will offer a significantly extended and refined reconstruction of the theorem in multi-agent modal logic. We will then show that a thorough reconstruction of the proof as given by Frauchiger and Renner requires the reflexivity of access relations (system mathsfmathbfT). However, a stronger theorem is possible that already follows in serial frames, and hence also holds in systems of emph{doxastic} logic (such as mathsfmathbfKD45). After proving this, we will discuss the general implications for different interpretations of quantum probabilities as well as several options for dealing with the result.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.11889




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