The effect of D-policy on the strategic customer behavior in \(M/G/1\) queues
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Publication:2294289
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.002zbMath1476.90083OpenAlexW2922362226WikidataQ114851400 ScholiaQ114851400MaRDI QIDQ2294289
Gang Chen, Jingchuan Zhang, Zai-Ming Liu
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.002
Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Equilibrium joining probabilities for an M/G/1 queue
- On balking from an empty queue
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- Equilibrium strategies for queues with impatient customers
- Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?
- The effect of catastrophes on the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems
- Homogeneous customers renege from invisible queues at random times under deteriorating waiting conditions
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