The effect of D-policy on the strategic customer behavior in \(M/G/1\) queues

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.002zbMath1476.90083OpenAlexW2922362226WikidataQ114851400 ScholiaQ114851400MaRDI QIDQ2294289

Gang Chen, Jingchuan Zhang, Zai-Ming Liu

Publication date: 10 February 2020

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

\(M/G/1\) queuedue dateequilibrium strategiessocial benefits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (1)

An overview of queuing delay and various delay based algorithms in networks

Cites Work

• Equilibrium joining probabilities for an M/G/1 queue
• On balking from an empty queue
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Equilibrium strategies for queues with impatient customers
• Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?
• The effect of catastrophes on the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems
• Homogeneous customers renege from invisible queues at random times under deteriorating waiting conditions

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