Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?
DOI10.1287/opre.2014.1280zbMath1302.90048OpenAlexW2007104164WikidataQ105788071 ScholiaQ105788071MaRDI QIDQ2931709
Fikri Karaesmen, Athanasia Manou, Antonis Economou
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1280
queueingpartial informationbalkingNash equilibrium strategystrategic customersclearing systemobservable modeltransportation stationunobservable model
Noncooperative games (91A10) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)
Related Items (19)
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