Customer behavior analysis in ticket windows at scenic spots from game-theoretic perspective
Summary: In service industries, especially in some ticket windows at scenic spots, affected by congestion, some customers often find excuses or ask the acquaintances in the queue so as to jump the queue and complete their corresponding service as early as possible. In this paper, we model the queueing phenomenon in the ticket windows at scenic spots as a special queue, namely, the so-called ``team queue. Although this phenomenon often happens in daily life, it is less well known to people. In a team queue, an arriving customer first searches the queue from the top to bottom to see if some of his teammates are already in the queue. If yes, he would join the queue and be served with his teammates; otherwise, he would join the queue at the tail. To this end, arising from the customers' perspective, the strategic behavior of queueing customers in the ticket windows at scenic spots is analyzed. On the basis of considering the waiting cost and reward, the individual strategies and social optimal strategies of queueing customers are derived, regarding the joining or balking dilemma and for the observable and unobservable cases. Finally, to demonstrate how various parameters affect the joining strategies, some numerical examples are provided.
- Ticket queues with regular and strategic customers
- Customers' strategic behavior in batch arrivals \(M^{2}/M/1\) queue
- Strategic behavior in queues with the effect of the number of customers behind
- Customers' joining behavior in an unobservable GI/Geo/m queue
- Strategic behavior and social optimization in Markovian vacation queues
- Analysis of a batch service multi-server polling system with dynamic service control
- Analysis of a batch service polling system in a multi-phase random environment
- Analysis of queueing systems with customer interjections
- Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes
- Equilibrium balking strategies for a clearing queueing system in alternating environment
- Equilibrium joining strategies in batch service queueing systems
- Equilibrium joining strategy in a batch transfer queuing system with gated policy
- Equilibrium threshold joining strategies in partially observable batch service queueing systems
- Monotonicity properties of user equilibrium policies for parallel batch systems
- Polling with Batch Service
- Pricing and priority auctions in queueing systems with a generalized delay cost structure
- Rational queueing
- Sharing delay information in service systems: a literature survey
- Strategic customers in a transportation station: when Is it optimal to wait?
- Tail asymptotics for a batch service polling system with retrials and nonpersistent customers
- The Impact of Inspection Cost on Equilibrium, Revenue, and Social Welfare in a Single-Server Queue
- The Israeli queue with a general group-joining policy
- THE ISRAELI QUEUE WITH INFINITE NUMBER OF GROUPS
- The Israeli Queue with priorities
- The Israeli queue with retrials
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- User equilibria for a parallel queueing system with state dependent routing
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