Bid caps in large contests

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.012zbMath1411.91259OpenAlexW2918262775WikidataQ128279030 ScholiaQ128279030MaRDI QIDQ2416637

Wojciech Olszewski, Ron Siegel

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.012

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsbid capslarge contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Large Contests

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