The \(P\)-value for cost sharing in minimum

DOI10.1007/s11238-004-5635-5zbMath1127.91316MaRDI QIDQ2487768

Henk Norde, S. H. Tijs, Stefano Moretti, Rodica Branzei

Publication date: 8 August 2005

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5635-5

zbMATH Keywords

cost sharing; value; population monotonic allocation schemes; minimum cost spanning tree games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C35: Programming involving graphs or networks

91A12: Cooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

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