Trade-offs between reliability and overheads in peer-to-peer reputation tracking

DOI10.1016/J.COMNET.2005.07.006MaRDI QIDQ2494745zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Minaxi Gupta, Mostafa Ammar, Mustaque Ahamad

Publication date 30 June 2006

Published in Computer Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2005.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

peer-to-peerreputationsGnutella

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computer system organization (68M99)

Recommendations

• Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments
• Behavior-based reputation management in P2P file-sharing networks
• A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
• The design of a reliable reputation system
• Incentives in peer-to-peer systems

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2030033 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cooperative peer groups in NICE
• Peer-to-peer's most wanted: malicious peers
• Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments

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