Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments

DOI10.1016/J.COMNET.2005.07.024MaRDI QIDQ2494750zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thanasis G. Papaioannou, George D. Stamoulis

Publication date 30 June 2006

Published in Computer Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2005.07.024

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesperformancepoliciesrandomized aggregationreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)

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(7)

• Trustworthy-based efficient data broadcast model for P2P interaction in resource-constrained wireless environments
• Self-enforcing protocols via co-utile reputation management
• Trade-offs between reliability and overheads in peer-to-peer reputation tracking
• Uncheatable Reputation for Distributed Computation Markets
• Incentives in peer-to-peer systems
• Active Networks
• A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems

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