A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems

DOI10.1007/S10660-010-9059-8MaRDI QIDQ608998zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thanasis G. Papaioannou, George D. Stamoulis

Publication date 30 November 2010

Published in Electronic Commerce Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/142596

zbMATH Keywords

steady statecollusionMarkov modelcredibilityrational adversariesstrategy proofSybil attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11)

Recommendations

• Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments
• Incentives in peer-to-peer systems
• Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms
• Trust Management
• Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2089740 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1975133 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 924915 (Why is no real title available?)
• A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
• Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms
• Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments
• Web-based reputation management systems: Problems and suggested solutions

Cited in

(11)

• Using identity premium for honesty enforcement and whitewashing prevention
• Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments
• Can bandwidth sharing be truthful?
• A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
• Anonymity and rewards in peer rating systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547975 (Why is no real title available?)
• Trade-offs between reliability and overheads in peer-to-peer reputation tracking
• Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms
• Trust Management
• Algorithms and incentives for robust ranking

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