A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European Union

DOI10.1016/j.cor.2004.06.010zbMath1116.91345OpenAlexW2067530957MaRDI QIDQ2567167

Marc Vielle, Alain Bernard, Laurent Viguier, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 29 September 2005

Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2004.06.010

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (3)

Stochastic internal rate of return on investments in sustainable assets generating carbon credits ⋮ A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS ⋮ A unified cooperative model for environmental costs in supply chains: the Shapley value for the linear case

Uses Software

• PATH Solver

Cites Work

• A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
• Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH solver
• Engineering and Economic Applications of Complementarity Problems

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