A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European Union
DOI10.1016/J.COR.2004.06.010zbMATH Open1116.91345OpenAlexW2067530957MaRDI QIDQ2567167FDOQ2567167
Authors: Laurent Viguier, Marc Vielle, Alain Bernard, Alain Haurie
Publication date: 29 September 2005
Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2004.06.010
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Cites Work
- Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH solver
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Engineering and Economic Applications of Complementarity Problems
- A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
- Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
Cited In (5)
- A unified cooperative model for environmental costs in supply chains: the Shapley value for the linear case
- A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
- A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
- Stochastic internal rate of return on investments in sustainable assets generating carbon credits
- Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets
Uses Software
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