A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European Union
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2567167
Recommendations
- A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
- Solving an equilibrium model for trade of \(\text{CO}_2\) emission permits
- A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
- A decomposition algorithm for finding equilibria in dynamic games
- An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy
Cites work
- A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
- Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
- Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH solver
- Engineering and Economic Applications of Complementarity Problems
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Cited in
(5)- A unified cooperative model for environmental costs in supply chains: the Shapley value for the linear case
- A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
- Stochastic internal rate of return on investments in sustainable assets generating carbon credits
- A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
- Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets
This page was built for publication: A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European Union
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2567167)