A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001zbMath1181.91240OpenAlexW2052900053MaRDI QIDQ844687

Marc Vielle, Alain Bernard, Alain B. Haurie, Laurent Viguier

Publication date: 19 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesChinaclimate changeKyoto protocolCournot-Nash equilibriumemission tradingRussiacomputable general equilibrium modeling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (14)

Numerical simulation for European and American option of risks in climate change of Three Gorges Reservoir Area ⋮ Transboundary Pollution Abatement, Emission Permits Trading and Compensation Mechanism: A Differential Game Analysis ⋮ Dynamic decision of transboundary basin pollution under emission permits and pollution abatement ⋮ A differential game of ecological compensation criterion for transboundary pollution abatement under learning by doing ⋮ Dynamic optimal control of transboundary pollution abatement under learning-by-doing depreciation ⋮ Modeling and computation of mean field equilibria in producers' game with emission permits trading ⋮ Fitted Finite Volume Method of Three Transboundary Pollution in Three Gorges Reservoir Area of Chongqing City with Emission Permits Trading by Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game ⋮ An empirical study of transboundary air pollution of the Beijing-Tianjin region ⋮ A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations ⋮ An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy ⋮ A Game of International Climate Policy Solved by a Homogeneous Oracle-Based Method for Variational Inequalities ⋮ Mathematical modeling of the consequences of Russia's participation in the Kyoto protocol: An optimization model approach ⋮ A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European Union ⋮ Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system

Uses Software

• PATH Solver

Cites Work

• Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH solver
• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• Stochastic equilibrium programming for dynamic oligopolistic markets
• \(S\)-adapted oligopoly equilibria and approximations in stochastic variational inequalities
• Equilibria and threats in a fishery management game
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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