A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844687
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001zbMath1181.91240MaRDI QIDQ844687
Marc Vielle, Alain Bernard, Alain B. Haurie, Laurent Viguier
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001
dynamic games; China; climate change; Kyoto protocol; Cournot-Nash equilibrium; emission trading; Russia; computable general equilibrium modeling
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91B74: Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.)
91A25: Dynamic games
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Uses Software
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