The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
There are different methods to build an anonymity service using MIXes. A substantial decision for doing so is the method of choosing the MIX route. In this paper we compare two special configurations: a fixed MIX route used by all participants and a network of freely usable MIXes where each participant chooses his own route. The advantages and disadvantages in respect to the freedom of choice are presented and examined. We'll show that some additional attacks are possible in networks with freely chosen MIX routes. After describing these attacks, we estimate their impact on the achievable degree of anonymity. Finally, we evaluate the relevance of the described attacks with respect to existing systems like e.g. Mixmaster, Crowds, and Freedom. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0976.68578].
- Limits of anonymity in open environments
- From a trickle to a flood: Active attacks on several mix types
- Comparison of commitment schemes used in mix-mediated anonymous communication for preventing pool-mode attacks
- Traffic analysis attacks and trade-offs in anonymity providing systems
- Flaws in some robust optimistic mix-nets
- A Framework for Automatically Checking Anonymity with μCRL
- From a trickle to a flood: Active attacks on several mix types
- Limits of anonymity in open environments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2090934 (Why is no real title available?)
- Klein Bottle Routing: An Alternative to Onion Routing and Mix Network
- cMix: mixing with minimal real-time asymmetric cryptographic operations
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