On the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms

DOI10.1145/2840728.2840736zbMATH Open1334.68104arXiv1511.04741OpenAlexW2268535217MaRDI QIDQ2800549FDOQ2800549

Aviad Rubinstein

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite size [DDT15], and may be computationally intractable [DDT14]. This has sparked recent interest in finding simple mechanisms that obtain reasonable approximations to the optimal revenue [HN12, LY13, BILW14]. In this work we attempt to find the optimal simple mechanism. There are many ways to define simple mechanisms. Here we restrict our search to partition mechanisms, where the seller partitions the items into disjoint bundles and posts a price for each bundle; the buyer is allowed to buy any number of bundles. We give a PTAS for the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing partition mechanism, and prove that the problem is strongly NP-hard. En route, we prove structural properties of near-optimal partition mechanisms which may be of independent interest: for example, there always exists a near-optimal partition mechanism that uses only a constant number of non-trivial bundles (i.e. bundles with more than one item).

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.04741

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationmechanism designPTASsimple mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

Cited In (7)

• A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
• Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms
• Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
• A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
• Simple complexity from imitation games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

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