Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection
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Publication:2827711
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5zbMath1400.94123OpenAlexW2508820885MaRDI QIDQ2827711
Bogdan Warinschi, Richard J. Lipton, Alexandra Boldyreva, Tae Soo Kim
Publication date: 21 October 2016
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/81493541/Bogdan_Warinschi_Provably_Secure_Remote_Memory_Attestation_for_Heap_Overflow_Protection.pdf
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- Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection
- Public Key Encryption against Related Key Attacks
- Public-Key Encryption Indistinguishable Under Plaintext-Checkable Attacks
- Secure Message Authentication Against Related-Key Attack
- The random oracle methodology, revisited
- Cryptography Secure against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering
- Provably Secure Virus Detection: Using The Observer Effect Against Malware.
- RKA Security beyond the Linear Barrier: IBE, Encryption and Signatures