Public-key encryption indistinguishable under plaintext-checkable attacks
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Publication:2941199
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_15zbMATH Open1345.94027DBLPconf/pkc/AbdallaBP15OpenAlexW2186096729WikidataQ56920957 ScholiaQ56920957MaRDI QIDQ2941199FDOQ2941199
Authors: Michel Abdalla, Fabrice Benhamouda, David Pointcheval
Publication date: 27 August 2015
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_15
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- Improving practical UC-secure commitments based on the DDH assumption
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- Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates
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