Public-key encryption indistinguishable under plaintext-checkable attacks
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Publication:2941199
Recommendations
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Cited in
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- Plaintext-verifiably-checkable encryption
- Verifier-based anonymous password-authenticated key exchange protocol in the standard model
- Hardware security without secure hardware: how to decrypt with a password and a server
- Public‐Key Encryption and Security Notions
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