Dark matters: exploitation as cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.04.020zbMATH Open1337.91019OpenAlexW2166441844WikidataQ48677253 ScholiaQ48677253MaRDI QIDQ289462FDOQ289462

Authors: Partha Dasgupta 

Publication date: 30 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.020

Recommendations

• Cooperation in the commons
• Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: An experimental evaluation
• Common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation
• Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
• On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcommon property resourceslong-term relationshipsmin-max strategyprisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.

Cited In (5)

• Evolving cooperation
• Cooperation and distributive conflict
• Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty: an experiment
• Common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation
• Public disclosure of players' conduct and common resources harvesting: experimental evidence from a Nairobi slum

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