Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXS014zbMATH Open1319.03022OpenAlexW2329080376MaRDI QIDQ2944409FDOQ2944409

Authors: Dylan Dodd 

Publication date: 2 September 2015

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs014

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zbMATH Keywords

principle of indifferenceimprecise credence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cited In (1)

• Coin flips, credences and the reflection principle

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