Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXS014MaRDI QIDQ2944409zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dylan Dodd

Publication date 2 September 2015

Published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs014

zbMATH Keywords

principle of indifferenceimprecise credence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

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Cited in

(1)

• Coin flips, credences and the reflection principle

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