The accuracy and rationality of imprecise credences

DOI10.1111/NOUS.12105MaRDI QIDQ4623327zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miriam Schoenfield

Publication date 15 February 2019

Published in Nôus (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12105

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(18)

• Vague credence
• The imprecise impermissivist's dilemma
• Mimicking, errors, and the optimal standard of proof
• Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences
• Coin flips, credences and the reflection principle
• Accuracy and credal imprecision
• A dilemma for the imprecise Bayesian
• Ideal rationality and logical omniscience
• Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
• Imprecise Bayesianism and global belief inertia
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747877 (Why is no real title available?)
• How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
• Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic world
• The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
• Higher-order evidence and losing one's conviction
• Credal imprecision and the value of evidence
• A unified treatment of risk and ambiguity within a rank-dependent framework
• Probability filters and desirable gambles

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