Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_14zbMath1406.91194OpenAlexW2559875027MaRDI QIDQ2959830

Christopher A. Wilkens, Christos Tzamos

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_14

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationauction designanonymous mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auction Design

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