Elimination of a second-law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
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Publication:296314
DOI10.3390/E16105223zbMATH Open1338.94077arXiv1406.5179OpenAlexW3105337294MaRDI QIDQ296314FDOQ296314
Authors: Laszlo B. Kish, Claes-Göran Granqvist 
Publication date: 15 June 2016
Published in: Entropy (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We introduce the so far most efficient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. This attack utilizes the lack of exact thermal equilibrium in practical applications and is based on cable resistance losses and the fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics cannot provide full security when such losses are present. The new attack does not challenge the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme, but it puts more stringent demands on the security/privacy enhancing protocol than for any earlier attack. In this paper we present a simple defense protocol to fully eliminate this new attack by increasing the noise-temperature at the side of the smaller resistance value over the noise-temperature at the at the side with the greater resistance. It is shown that this simple protocol totally removes Eve's information not only for the new attack but also for the old Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv attack. The presently most efficient attacks against the KLJN scheme are thereby completely nullified.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.5179
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Cites Work
- Noise in the wire: the real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson(-like) noise based secure communicator
- Johnson(-like)-noise-Kirchhoff-loop based secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges of two to two thousand kilometers, via model-line
- A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise-how secure?
- Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson (-like) noise and Kirchhoff's law
Cited In (6)
- Johnson(-like)-noise-Kirchhoff-loop based secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges of two to two thousand kilometers, via model-line
- A new look at the classical key exchange system based on amplified Johnson noise
- Notes on recent approaches concerning the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise-based secure key exchange
- A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise-how secure?
- Response to Scheuer-Yariv: ``A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise-how secure?
- Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson (-like) noise and Kirchhoff's law
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