Totally secure classical communication utilizing Johnson (-like) noise and Kirchhoff's law
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Publication:973577
DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2005.11.062zbMATH Open1187.81051arXivphysics/0509136OpenAlexW2154549916MaRDI QIDQ973577FDOQ973577
Publication date: 2 June 2010
Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: An absolutely secure, fast, inexpensive, robust, maintenance-free and low-power- consumption communication is proposed. The states of the information bit are represented by two resistance values. The sender and the receiver have such resistors available and they randomly select and connect one of them to the channel at the beginning of each clock period. The thermal noise voltage and current can be observed but Kirchoff's law provides only a second-order equation. A secure bit is communicated when the actual resistance values at the sender's side and the receiver's side differ. Then the second order equation yields the two resistance values but the eavesdropper is unable to determine the actual locations of the resistors and to find out the state of the sender's bit. The receiver knows that the sender has the inverse of his bit, similarly to quantum entanglement. The eavesdropper can decode the message if, for each bits, she inject current in the wire and measures the voltage change and the current changes in the two directions. However, in this way she gets discovered by the very first bit she decodes. Instead of thermal noise, proper external noise generators should be used when the communication is not aimed to be stealth.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0509136
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classical informationsecure communicationclassical bit entanglementeavesdropper detectionstealth communication
Cites Work
Cited In (11)
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- Elimination of a second-law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
- Johnson(-like)-noise-Kirchhoff-loop based secure classical communicator characteristics, for ranges of two to two thousand kilometers, via model-line
- A new look at the classical key exchange system based on amplified Johnson noise
- Notes on recent approaches concerning the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise-based secure key exchange
- A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise-how secure?
- Response to Scheuer-Yariv: ``A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise-how secure?
- INSTANTANEOUS, NON-SQUEEZED, NOISE-BASED LOGIC
- Security risk during the transient in a key exchange protocol using random signals and feedback
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