Coalition formation with learning from predecessors: a case of dynamic positive externality

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00352.XMaRDI QIDQ2994796zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ahmed Saber Mahmud

Publication date 29 April 2011

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00352.x

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationdynamic externalitysequential move

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2067999
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Coalition formation problems with externalities

Cites work

• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Networks of collaboration in oligopoly.
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division

This page was built for publication: Coalition formation with learning from predecessors: a case of dynamic positive externality

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2994796)