Coalition formation with learning from predecessors: a case of dynamic positive externality

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00352.XzbMATH Open1210.91053OpenAlexW2047083210MaRDI QIDQ2994796FDOQ2994796

Authors: Ahmed Saber Mahmud 

Publication date: 29 April 2011

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00352.x

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zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationdynamic externalitysequential move

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Networks of collaboration in oligopoly.
• Equilibrium binding agreements

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