Preferences for contractual forms in supply chains

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.047zbMath1338.90058OpenAlexW1974747901MaRDI QIDQ299789

Lijian Lu, Yao-zhong Wu

Publication date: 23 June 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.047

zbMATH Keywords

competitionsupply chain managementcontracting preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items

Contract design under asymmetric demand information for sustainable supply chain practices

Cites Work

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