Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games

zbMATH Open1240.91016arXiv0711.2334MaRDI QIDQ3018263FDOQ3018263

Authors: Titu Andreescu, Zoran Šunić 

Publication date: 21 July 2011

Abstract: A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand coalition in all convex games and the tau-value encourages the grand coalitions in convex games up to three (but not more than three) players. Solution functions that encourage the grand coalition in convex games always produce allocations in the core, but the converse is not necessarily true.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0711.2334

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesShapley valueconvex games\(\tau\)-valuetransferable utility gamesgrand coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cited In (1)

• Simultaneous penalization and subsidization for stabilizing grand cooperation

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