Markov Perfect Equilibrium Advertising Strategies of Lanchester Duopoly Model: A Technical Note
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3114917
DOI10.1287/mnsc.1040.0249zbMath1232.91465OpenAlexW2030398740MaRDI QIDQ3114917
Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Ramla Jarrar, Georges Zaccour
Publication date: 19 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0249
Related Items (11)
An empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions ⋮ Recent developments in dynamic advertising research ⋮ Quality improvement and goodwill accumulation in a dynamic duopoly ⋮ Spatial attrition modeling: stability conditions for a FD formulation ⋮ Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications ⋮ A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing ⋮ Strategic rivalry for market share: a contest theory approach to dynamic advertising competition ⋮ Dynamic modeling of nontargeted and targeted advertising strategies in an oligopoly ⋮ A review of dynamic Stackelberg game models ⋮ An oligopoly model of dynamic advertising competition ⋮ Asymmetric horizontal differentiation under advertising in a Cournot duopoly
This page was built for publication: Markov Perfect Equilibrium Advertising Strategies of Lanchester Duopoly Model: A Technical Note
