scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3882406
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0512.00010.] An attempt at solving the well-known paradox of omniscience (concerning the propositional attitudes) within possible worlds semantics. Taking over Hintikka's idea of impossible possible worlds the author builds a modal propositional logic with the modal operator K (somebody knows that), where the respective environmental structure distinguishes between the set of classical possible worlds W and the set of epistemic possible worlds U (W\(\subset U)\). For W there holds the classical logic whereas for U-W the valuation is arbitrary. Consistency and completeness of the presented system is proved; however, it is nearly impossible to check the particular steps of the proof because of a very bad quality of reproduction.
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