Information and impossibilities
The author outlines a theory called informationalism. The presentation of informationalism is based on a discussion of the notion of possibility. Stalnaker's moderate modal realism is adopted, according to which possible worlds are ways things might have been. The question is raised whether there are also ways things could not have been. If propositions are indentified with sets of possible worlds, then every impossible proposition is represented by the empty set, an account that does not do justice to the fact that we may have different attitudes towards impossible propositions expressed by different sentences. Moreover, if sentences true in every possible world have null information content, then every mathematical truth has null information content. Whereas Stalnaker rejects the notion of impossible world, the familiar idea that an increase of information corresponds to an elimination of possibilities brings the author to countenancing impossible worlds (understood as ways things could not have been). It is noted that the available information and the possibilities may change and hence depend on a context in some way or other. The states of a given inquiry depend on the subject matter and issues regarded as relevant to the inquiry. A state is a way of resolving all relevant issues. If a state is incompatible with the available information, it is an impossible state, otherwise it is a possible state. Taking into account the inverse relation between the available information and the set of possibilities makes it possible, for instance, to envisage a situation in which the relevant information is such that it does not preclude round squares. Moreover, the author claims that ``full-fledged imagining is an infallible guide to at least a kind of possibility, where the kind of possibility also depends on the available information. In the final section informationalism is outlined as a mathematical theory based on the notions of an information context and an informational modal framework. The paper may be seen as an interesting and useful contribution to making impossible worlds more respectable in philosophical logic and related areas. Unfortunately, the references to other work on non-normal worlds are incomplete. Barwise points out that the notion of impossible state ``can be useful for characterizing the beliefs of those of us who are less than logically omniscient. The application of non-normal worlds in epistemic logic in order to overcome closure under logical consequence and other descriptively inadequate properties of the notion of belief in standard systems of epistemic logic has been dealt with, for instance, also by \textit{V. Rantala} [Acta Philos. Fenn. 35, 106-115 (1982; Zbl 0519.03002); Stud. Log. 41, 41-65 (1982; Zbl 0529.03004)], \textit{J. Hintikka} [J. Philos. Log. 4, 475-484 (1975; Zbl 0334.02003)], \textit{H. Wansing} [Z. Math. Log. Grundl. Math. 35, 551-557 (1989; Zbl 0685.03012); Stud. Log. 49, 523-539, 50, 359 (1990/91; Zbl 0744.03028)], \textit{E. Thijsse} [Partial logic and knowledge representation (Delft, (1992)] and \textit{E. Thijsse}, and \textit{H. Wansing} [J. Appl. Non-Class. Log. 6, 127-136 (1996; Zbl 0849.03012)].
- Non-normal worlds and representation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5164528
- Bemerkungen Zur Semantik Nicht‐Normaler Möglicher Welten
- The ontology of impossible worlds
- Impossible worlds
- Impossible worlds: A modest approach
- Logical and epistemological significance of inconsistent and incomplete worlds and their applications
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3882406
- Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result
- Information, negation, and paraconsistency
- A Mathematical Theory of Communication
- Counterfactuals and comparative possibility
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357431 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 819502 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3260754 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information Flow
- Intuitive semantics for first-degree entailments and `coupled trees'
- Information and random censoring
- Impossible worlds and partial belief
- Logical geometries and information in the square of oppositions
- Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result
- Logical pluralism and semantic information
- Dynamic statistical information theory
- 2000 European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Logic Colloquium 2000. La Sorbonne, Paris, France, July 23-31, 2000
- On when a disjunction is informative. Ambiguous connectives and a realist commitment to pluralism
- Information flow and impossible situations
- The Information Paradox
- The information paradox: a pedagogical introduction
- Logical and epistemological significance of inconsistent and incomplete worlds and their applications
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 823601 (Why is no real title available?)
- Informational semantics as a third alternative?
- Non-normal worlds and representation
- Strongly semantic information as information about the truth
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5046294 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information, possible worlds and the cooptation of scepticism
- A truthmaker-based epistemic logic
- Hybrid modal realism debugged
- Formalizing the conditionals of Diodorus Cronus and Chrysippus: logic and potential applications in human thinking
This page was built for publication: Information and impossibilities
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1276417)