Onset of limit cycles in population games with attractiveness driven strategy choice
DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2013.07.008zbMATH Open1348.91036OpenAlexW2060832320MaRDI QIDQ336253FDOQ336253
Authors: Elżbieta Kukla, Tadeusz Platkowski 
Publication date: 10 November 2016
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.008
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with logit dynamics
- Oscillatory dynamics in rock-paper-scissors games with mutations
- Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles
Cited In (5)
- Allee effect induced diversity in evolutionary dynamics
- Emergence of a New Attracting Set by a Mixed Strategy in Game Dynamics
- Evolutionary coalitional games
- Shapley value redistribution of social wealth fosters cooperation in social dilemmas
- Bifurcation analysis of three-strategy imitative dynamics with mutations
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