Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes

DOI10.1002/nav.20117zbMath1112.90040OpenAlexW2126307378MaRDI QIDQ3423260

Boaz Golany, Uriel G. Rothblum

Publication date: 20 February 2007

Published in: Naval Research Logistics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.20117

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsupply chain managementlinear reward schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (9)

Integrating inventory control and a price change in the presence of reference price effects: a two-period model ⋮ Dynamic conformance and design quality in a supply chain: an assessment of contracts' coordinating power ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players ⋮ The transshipment fund mechanism: Coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem ⋮ A generalized two-agent location problem: Asymmetric dynamics and coordination ⋮ Strategic equilibrium versus global optimum for a pair of competing servers ⋮ Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme ⋮ TRANSSHIPMENTS IN HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENTS: COOPERATIVE VERSUS NONCOOPERATIVE QUALITY CONTROL GAME ⋮ A joint quay crane assignment and scheduling problem: formulation, solution algorithm and computational results

Cites Work

• Quantitative models for supply chain management
• Handbook of quantitative supply chain analysis. Modeling in the e-business era
• Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
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