Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1206370 (Why is no real title available?)
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Convergence Conditions for Nonlinear Programming Algorithms
- Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes
- Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
- Microeconomic theory
- Potential games
- Public goods, growth, and welfare
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(4)- Inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium for selfish machine covering on two hierarchical uniform machines
- Approximating Wardrop Equilibria with Finitely Many Agents
- Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria
- Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?
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