Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players
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Publication:2467438
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2006.12.006zbMATH Open1210.91005OpenAlexW2068630117MaRDI QIDQ2467438FDOQ2467438
Publication date: 21 January 2008
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.12.006
Cites Work
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Potential games
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- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
- Convergence Conditions for Nonlinear Programming Algorithms
- Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes
- Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
- Public goods, growth, and welfare
Cited In (3)
Recommendations
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games π π
- Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria π π
- The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing π π
- Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy π π
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games π π
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