Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players
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Publication:2467438
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2006.12.006zbMATH Open1210.91005OpenAlexW2068630117MaRDI QIDQ2467438FDOQ2467438
Authors: Uriel G. Rothblum 
Publication date: 21 January 2008
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.12.006
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Cites Work
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Cited In (4)
- Approximating Wardrop Equilibria with Finitely Many Agents
- Inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium for selfish machine covering on two hierarchical uniform machines
- Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?
- Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria
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