COPS OR ROBBERS — A BISTABLE SOCIETY
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3545707
Abstract: The norm game described by Axelrod in 1985 was recently treated with the master equation formalism. Here we discuss the equations, where {it i)} those who break the norm cannot punish and those who punish cannot break the norm, {it ii)} the tendency to punish is suppressed if the majority breaks the norm. The second mechanism is new. For some values of the parameters the solution shows the saddle-point bifurcation. Then, two stable solutions are possible, where the majority breaks the norm or the majority punishes. This means, that the norm breaking can be discontinuous, when measured in the social scale. The bistable character is reproduced also with new computer simulations on the Erd{H o}s--R'enyi directed network.
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6180528
- Cops, robbers, and burning bridges
- Cops and an insightful robber
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5241699
- Conjectures on cops and robbers
- Cops, robber and traps
- Variations on cops and robbers
- Cops and robbers from a distance
- Cops and robber with constraints
- On a game of policemen and robber
Cites work
Cited in
(4)
This page was built for publication: COPS OR ROBBERS — A BISTABLE SOCIETY
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3545707)
