COPS OR ROBBERS β€” A BISTABLE SOCIETY

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Publication:3545707

DOI10.1142/S0129183108012753zbMATH Open1152.91751arXiv0802.1488OpenAlexW3103058255WikidataQ112173785 ScholiaQ112173785MaRDI QIDQ3545707FDOQ3545707

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Publication date: 11 December 2008

Published in: International Journal of Modern Physics C (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The norm game described by Axelrod in 1985 was recently treated with the master equation formalism. Here we discuss the equations, where {it i)} those who break the norm cannot punish and those who punish cannot break the norm, {it ii)} the tendency to punish is suppressed if the majority breaks the norm. The second mechanism is new. For some values of the parameters the solution shows the saddle-point bifurcation. Then, two stable solutions are possible, where the majority breaks the norm or the majority punishes. This means, that the norm breaking can be discontinuous, when measured in the social scale. The bistable character is reproduced also with new computer simulations on the Erd{H o}s--R'enyi directed network.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0802.1488





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