Mathematical Analysis of the Interactions Between Oligopolistic Firms and a Competitive Fringe

DOI10.1080/01966324.1987.10737212MaRDI QIDQ3757650zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Hanif D. Sherali, Allen L. Soyster, Frederic H. Murphy

Publication date 1987

Published in American Journal of Mathematical and Management Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/01966324.1987.10737212

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gameoligopolymarket structurecompetitive fringeleader- followercomputation of Nash-Cournot equilibriafollower-follower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3599745 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
• A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
• Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
• Mathematical optimization and economic theory
• Non-cooperative games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Sequential Equilibria

Cited in

(4)

• A Mathematical Programming Approach to a Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Analysis for a Two-Stage Network of Oligopolies
• Convergence analysis and algorithmic implications of two dynamic processes toward an oligopoly-competitive fringe equilibrium solution
• An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly
• An oligopoly-fringe model with HARA preferences

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