Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0364-2zbMATH Open1294.91095OpenAlexW1965041271MaRDI QIDQ404990FDOQ404990

Authors: Ross A. Tippit 

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0364-2

Recommendations

• Credit markets with moral hazard and heterogeneous valuations of collateral
• Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior
• Unproductive investment and rent extraction
• Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game
• Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddeceptionfraudlending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting

This page was built for publication: Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q404990)