Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0364-2MaRDI QIDQ404990zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ross A. Tippit

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0364-2

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddeceptionfraudlending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Credit markets with moral hazard and heterogeneous valuations of collateral
• Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior
• Unproductive investment and rent extraction
• Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game
• Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle

Cites work

• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

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